CSRF靶機實例https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_41598660/article/details/103950903
dvwa漏洞代碼
<?php
if( isset( $_GET[ 'Change' ] ) ) {
// Get input
$pass_new = $_GET[ 'password_new' ];
$pass_conf = $_GET[ 'password_conf' ];
// Do the passwords match?
if( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) {
// They do!
$pass_new = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"], $pass_new ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
$pass_new = md5( $pass_new );
// Update the database
$insert = "UPDATE `users` SET password = '$pass_new' WHERE user = '" . dvwaCurrentUser() . "';";
$result = mysqli_query($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"], $insert ) or die( '<pre>' . ((is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_error($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) : (($___mysqli_res = mysqli_connect_error()) ? $___mysqli_res : false)) . '</pre>' );
// Feedback for the user
$html .= "<pre>Password Changed.</pre>";
}
else {
// Issue with passwords matching
$html .= "<pre>Passwords did not match.</pre>";
}
((is_null($___mysqli_res = mysqli_close($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]))) ? false : $___mysqli_res);
}
?>
代碼分析如下:
$pass_new = $_GET[ 'password_new' ];
$pass_conf = $_GET[ 'password_conf' ];
Get型獲取新密碼,然後判斷該密碼是否一致 if( $pass_new == $pass_conf )
,如果一致則執行數據庫的一些操作,並進行md5加密,$pass_new = md5( $pass_new );
然後就直接執行了密碼更新的數據庫操作語句
$insert = "UPDATE `users` SET password = '$pass_new' WHERE user = '" . dvwaCurrentUser() . "';";
這就導致了任意用戶只要點擊僞造好的鏈接即可更改密碼
代碼防範案例分析:
<?php
if( isset( $_GET[ 'Change' ] ) ) {
// Check Anti-CSRF token
checkToken( $_REQUEST[ 'user_token' ], $_SESSION[ 'session_token' ], 'index.php' );
// Get input
$pass_curr = $_GET[ 'password_current' ];
$pass_new = $_GET[ 'password_new' ];
$pass_conf = $_GET[ 'password_conf' ];
// Sanitise current password input
$pass_curr = stripslashes( $pass_curr );
$pass_curr = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"], $pass_curr ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
$pass_curr = md5( $pass_curr );
// Check that the current password is correct
$data = $db->prepare( 'SELECT password FROM users WHERE user = (:user) AND password = (:password) LIMIT 1;' );
$data->bindParam( ':user', dvwaCurrentUser(), PDO::PARAM_STR );
$data->bindParam( ':password', $pass_curr, PDO::PARAM_STR );
$data->execute();
// Do both new passwords match and does the current password match the user?
if( ( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) && ( $data->rowCount() == 1 ) ) {
// It does!
$pass_new = stripslashes( $pass_new );
$pass_new = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"], $pass_new ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
$pass_new = md5( $pass_new );
// Update database with new password
$data = $db->prepare( 'UPDATE users SET password = (:password) WHERE user = (:user);' );
$data->bindParam( ':password', $pass_new, PDO::PARAM_STR );
$data->bindParam( ':user', dvwaCurrentUser(), PDO::PARAM_STR );
$data->execute();
該防範機制設置了checktoken函數
checkToken( $_REQUEST[ 'user_token' ], $_SESSION[ 'session_token' ], 'index.php' );
然後再定位一下checktoken函數的定義,如果user的token值與更改密碼時的token值不相等或者不存在seesion_token值,便會報錯,這樣就防止了僞造攻擊
function checkToken( $user_token, $session_token, $returnURL ) { # Validate the given (CSRF) token
if( $user_token !== $session_token || !isset( $session_token ) ) {
dvwaMessagePush( 'CSRF token is incorrect' );
dvwaRedirect( $returnURL );
}
}
並且該機制還對比了舊密碼和新密碼,只有輸入的舊密碼一致了才能更改新密碼
if( ( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) && ( $data->rowCount() == 1 ) ) {
其中的一些防禦函數
stripslashes() 函數:
stripslashes() 函數刪除由 addslashes() 函數添加的反斜槓
mysql_real_escape_string() 函數
轉義 SQL 語句中使用的字符串中的特殊字符。
mysql_real_escape_string(string,connection)
如果成功,則該函數返回被轉義的字符串。如果失敗,則返回 false。